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A l e v Ç ı n a r
Subversion and Subjugation in the Public Sphere:
Secularism and the Islamic Headscarf
I
n the mid-1980s, university students wearing the Islamic headscarf
started to appear in public places in Turkey, giving a new sort of visi-
bility to Islam in the public sphere, contrary to the secularist norms
sanctioned by the state.1 Within a decade the headscarf went from being
a controversial item of religious attire to a matter of Turkish national
security. In February 1997, the National Security Council identified the
headscarf as one of the main indicators of what they called the “Islamic
threat”—the single most important threat to the well-being and security
of the country—and called for the enforcement of a ban on the headscarf
in all public places, including classrooms, universities, and public offices.2
How is it that such a simple item of clothing can turn into such a powerful
disruptive force?
This article explores the headscarf controversy in the context of con-
temporary debates about gender and the public sphere. I am particularly
interested in how the public sphere in Turkey has been produced in re-
lation to norms of secularism and modernity by the forging and display
of new gender identities, especially through regulations on clothing and
the appearance of women. I also examine the emergence of new Islamic
subjectivities through the increasing visibility of the Islamic headscarf in
secular public spaces, which poses a sufficiently formidable challenge to
the authority and power of secularist discourse that it has been deemed
1 There are a wide variety of ways in which women wear head coverings in Turkey. The
controversial headscarf that is of concern here is one that is part of a distinct type of Islamic
dress, which typically includes a scarf tied under the chin so as to conceal the hair as well
as the neck, worn with loose-fitting long dresses or overcoats. This type of attire is almost
identical to what has been termed new veiling by Arlene MacLeod, referring to a type of
Muslim dress that emerged in Egypt in the early eighties and is a specifically urban and
middle-class phenomenon and not a continuation of a traditional Muslim dress style (1991,
109–12).
2 National Security Council decree number 406, February 28, 1997. This decree was
not made public in full, but parts of it are available (in Turkish) in Eraydın (2006).
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a threat to national security. By comparing the gendered and gendering
interventions of the secularizing Turkish state of the 1920s and the Islam-
ist elite of the 1990s, I will suggest that Jürgen Habermas’s conception
of the public sphere requires revision. Contrary to the notion that the
public sphere is a space for political participation and the expansion of
political liberties, women’s experiences in the public sphere require a
more complicated assessment of the nature and uses of the public sphere.
Indeed, I will argue that, understood as a gendered regime of presence
and visibility, the public sphere can limit political liberties and operate as
a form of subjugation.
The public sphere: Liberation or subjugation?
The idea of the public sphere was developed by Habermas as the field
where emancipation from domination and coercion could be realized. For
Habermas, the public sphere is a nonexclusive realm of private individuals
debating issues of “common concern” (1989, 36).3 Habermas assumes
that the ideal public sphere, which is formed through unconstrained de-
bate and deliberation among free individuals, will allow for the emergence
of reason and that reason alone will overcome domination and bring about
emancipation (1989, 35–37).
The ideal public sphere functions on three principles. First, the key
constitutive element of the public sphere is rational-critical debate on is-
sues of common interest. Ideally, rational deliberation results in decisions
and policies that are assumed to serve the common good, thereby bringing
about emancipation. Second, for the common good to be realized, it is
crucial that the public sphere remain inclusive so that “access is guaranteed
to all citizens” (Habermas 1974, 49). The third and most controversial
element of the Habermasian public sphere is that particular identities,
interests, and status differences are seen as the main impediment to the
attainment of rational solutions to so-called common ideals and, as such,
should be bracketed out of public debates (Calhoun 1992, 13). For Ha-
bermas, the common good can be attained only if the debated issues are
of interest to society in general. In this account, the particularistic de-
mands and interests of the debating individuals, as well as the issues that
seem to be of concern only to a limited group of people, are construed
as factors that distort and obscure rational deliberation and therefore must
be avoided.
Habermas’s conceptualization assumes that the public sphere is a field
3 For a more detailed discussion of the public sphere, see Çınar (2005).
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wherein emancipation and democratic liberties are realized, but it over-
looks the ways in which the public sphere can also produce power relations
and hierarchies to the detriment of most participants. Critics have pointed
out that the Habermasian notion of the public sphere treats particular
identities and differences in problematic ways. Several authors have noted
that the exclusion of the interests of women (Fraser 1993; Cohen 1995;
Benhabib 1996), the working class, and identities forged around race,
ethnicity, or religion (Calhoun 1992, 34–36) is not only discriminatory
but impedes the attainment of the common good. Despite such cogent
critiques, most of these scholars remain loyal to the Habermasian ideal,
noting that, suitably amended, the public sphere can fulfill its promise as
a field of emancipation and liberation.
Other writers have developed more radical criticisms, challenging the
normative value ascribed to the ideal public sphere and questioning the
emancipatory power of public discourse itself (see, e.g., Warner 1992;
Berlant 1993; Landes 1995). Rather than engaging the conventional de-
bate about how the ideal public sphere should function, these critics are
concerned with the actual operations of existing public spheres. On the
basis of a critical examination of existing public spheres, they suggest that
particular interests and identities do not exist prior to or outside the public
sphere but rather are produced by and are constitutive of the public sphere.
Joan Landes, for example, argues that the exclusion of women from the
public sphere in eighteenth-century France was not just a historical co-
incidence but a constitutive act that produced the citizen as an exclusively
male subject (1995, 99). Appeals to universal principles of liberty and
equality and the celebration of common interests at the expense of par-
ticularities actually consolidated white male power while concealing the
subjugation of excluded subjectivities (e.g., women and black colonial
subjects). This line of criticism suggests that power and domination are
inherent in the founding logic of the public sphere.
Contesting the operations of publicity: The gaze as a productive
technology
For Habermas and others who take speech and deliberation as its con-
stitutive elements, the public sphere is formed when people engage in
dialogue on political issues, wresting the determinants of publicity away
from the sovereign and generating “public opinion [that] can by definition
only come into existence when a reasoning public is presupposed” (Ha-
bermas 1974, 50). Within this understanding, the public emerges as actual
people who produce public discourse through rational debate and dia-
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logue in newspapers, pamphlets, broadsheets, coffeehouse conversations,
or any other gathering where issues of common concern are addressed.
Some scholars have questioned the conceptual assumptions of this ac-
count, however, envisioning the public less as an actual group of people
and more as an imagined subject constituted through the conjuring of a
disembodied, impersonal, authoritative voice that emerges primarily in
the print media (Warner 1992, 381–82). Examining the American public
sphere, Lauren Berlant observes that a white male public subject emerges
with an unmarked identity, which successfully erases the marks of his
maleness and whiteness, through the extension of what seem to be pro-
tections and privileges to participants of the public sphere. For Berlant,
“the effect of these privileges,” particularly extended to women and Af-
rican Americans, function to mark bodies with race and gender, which in
turn enables the public subject “to appear to be disembodied or abstract
while retaining cultural authority” (1993, 176).
Understanding the public sphere not only as a disembodied voice but
also as a regime of visibility produced through the media and state-me-
diated discourses is particularly helpful for an examination of the pro-
duction of the public subject and the appropriation of gender in the
Turkish public sphere. The current-day popular press in Turkey continually
invokes the voice of a disembodied public subject in news stories ranging
from issues of high politics to seemingly trivial things like sports. For
example, a highly popular slogan chanted at soccer games that also appears
frequently in the media, not only in relation to sports but for other issues
as well, is “Europe, Europe, hear our voice; this is the sound of us march-
ing.” This slogan is telling in that it interpellates the Turkish public subject
as an unmarked, disembodied, singular “us” and a competent rival to the
European one. A more telling example is enmeshed in the coverage of a
woman who shouted “Long live secularism!” in the midst of an Islamist
rally in support of the Islamist Refah (Welfare) Party.4 One of the major
newspapers featured this story on the front page with the headline “This
Is Our ‘Braveheart’” (Sabah 1997), conjuring a public subject who is at
once secularist and national. Courageous enough to stand up to a crowd
4 In the late 1980s the Refah Party was the main Islamist political party in Turkey.
Banned twice by the Constitutional Court, in 1998 and again in 2001, the party reappeared
first as the Fazilet (Virtue) Party in 1998 and then as the Saadet (Felicity) Party in 2001.
In 2001, the moderate wing of Refah/Fazilet, representing the younger generation, left the
party to found the Adalet ve Kalkınma (AK, or Justice and Development) Party under the
leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, who came to power as the leader of a majority gov-
ernment following the November 2002 elections. Adalet ve Kalkınma was the first single
party to come to power in Turkey that endorsed an Islam-based political ideology.
This content downloaded from 139.179.072.098 on July 19, 2018 13:20:42 PM
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
S I G N S Summer 2008 ❙ 895
of Islamists on her own, this “Braveheart” woman is construed as a na-
tional hero. Although the story of the incident stems from actual events,
the public subject produced here is more an imagined disembodied na-
tional subject than an actual person. Evoked through referrals to various
concrete others, this unmarked Turkish public subject is nonetheless sit-
uated in an abstract space and imagined as a single body with a single
voice and gaze that gains presence by marking its various others but itself
remaining unmarked, disembodied, and invisible. Through positing and
reproducing its others (European, Islamist) in daily discourse, the public
gaze marks its periphery as it situates the public subject at the invisible
center without having to explicitly name and mark itself. This publicity
produces a subject position imagined as public collectivity with a partic-
ular yet unmarked identity.
If the authoritative presence of the public subject is established through
various interventions in daily public discourse that mark and unmark sub-
jects, involving a wide array of images, displays, performances, and other
visual articulations, then it is clear that the public subject is constructed
not only verbally, through the authoritative voice of the media, but more
importantly visually, through a disembodied gaze. The media produces
the public subject not only through voice but also through a regime of
visuality. The print media, augmented by other media replete with cameras,
audiovisual technology, videos, and satellites, “invests the public subject
with the privilege and authority of gazing at most anything and everything
it wants” (Çınar 2005, 39–40).
In this view, the public sphere of the late twentieth century is better
understood as a field of appearances, performances, images, and displays.
In contrast to Habermas’s rejection of the turn to visuality with its con-
comitant erosion of deliberative exchanges as an indication of the degen-
eration and disintegration of the public sphere (1989, 159–80), I would
argue that viewing the public sphere as a visually constituted field opens
up important possibilities for analyzing the circulation of power and the
construction of public subjects (see also Carpignano 1999).
This understanding illuminates how the public sphere is imbricated
within everyday relations of power while also contributing to the pro-
duction of hierarchies of difference, exclusions, and inclusions, not only
through verbal debates and dialogues but visually through images, dis-
plays, and performances. Within such a visually constituted public sphere,
visibility and the controlled inclusion of particular subjectivities are tech-
nologies of authority and power. When viewed in this light, the public
sphere is no longer a site of emancipation or liberation that comes through
debate and dialogue but a field of visuality that subjugates through con-
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trolled silences, performative acts, speech acts, and visual displays. It is a
visually constituted field of power relations where subjugation operates
through the ongoing marking and categorization of diverse visibilities and
subjectivities by the public gaze. Consider, for example, Burçak Keskin-
Kozat’s analysis of the public controversy over the case of Konca Kuriş,
an outspoken veiled feminist who was murdered by extremists in 2000.
Keskin-Kozat draws attention to the widespread confusion and ambiguity
in the media over whether Kuriş was to be categorized as “an Islamist,
an Islamic feminist or a feminist” (2003, 198). Keskin-Kozat sees this
ambiguity not as a symptom of the inadequacy of these analytical cate-
gories but as an instance of the ways that “social categories homogenize
individuals’ diverse experiences into stereotypical constructs that structure
and give meaning to their everyday practices” (2003, 199). But these
social categories, which are ascribed agency and culpability by Keskin-
Kozat, are themselves the product of the public sphere that organizes,
categorizes, monitors, and hierarchically orders public subjects through
its gaze. Expanding the operations of publicity to include visual as well
as verbal registers offers important clues to understanding the production
of new veiling practices as a threat to national security.
Marking Islam, unmarking secularism, and possibilities for subversion
As Talal Asad (2003) has noted, secularism is not really about the sup-
pression or exclusion of religion from political life but about its control—
or, more precisely, about a particular production of religion that justifies
the existence of secularism. Contrary to the assumption that secularism
replaces religion, it produces and reproduces religion in order to sustain
itself as the norm. “The space that religion may properly occupy in society
has to be continually redefined by the law because the reproduction of
secular life within and beyond the nation-state continually affects the dis-
cursive clarity of that space,” Asad writes (2003, 201). To fully understand
the secular appropriations of Islam by the law in Turkey, secularism must
be “pursued through its shadows,” the spaces to which it consigns Islam
(2003, 16).5
In Turkey, secularism was established as one of the most essential prin-
ciples of the founding ideology. The institutionalization of secularism in-
volved the construction of a public sphere around secularist norms, which
5 Throughout this article I use the terms secularism and Islamism as political ideologies,
or political projects, that seek to transform society and establish a sociopolitical order on the
basis of a set of constitutive norms and principles.
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were measured by the degree to which Islam was kept under the control
of secularist discourse. Secularism established and preserved its privileged
position at the center of public discourse by confining Islam to a specific
and tightly monitored visibility in the public sphere. Islam was marked as
the backward, the uncultured and uneducated, the rural, the traditional,
the particular, the lower class, so as to allow secularism to enjoy the
unmarked position of being the advanced, the cultured and educated, the
urban, the modern, the universal, the upper class. The authority and
privilege of secularism was predicated upon the preservation of these bi-
nary oppositions that kept Islam as the marked, underprivileged other.
West-oriented modernization and the rise of Islamism
Since the end of the eighteenth century, when the Ottoman rulers faced
the necessity of reforming the administrative and political system, there
has been a search for a modernization project that would successfully
transform Ottoman state and society. Throughout the nineteenth century
this search was marked by heated debates over what path modernization
would follow: one that takes a Western/European model as the universal
norm toward which society would be transformed or one that adheres to
local traditions, values, and customs, namely Islam, as the basis upon which
reform and change would be implemented. This search eventually cul-
minated in the fall of the Ottoman system and the rise of the Turkish
Republic in 1923 and was based on a West-oriented modernization project
and a new national identity that was envisioned as Western, modern,
secular, and nationalist.
This new national identity was constructed and set as the norm around
which the public sphere was organized, by contrasting it with Islamism
and Ottomanism, both of which were framed and projected by the found-
ing elite as tropes of the backward, barbaric, uncivilized, dark, and cat-
astrophic (Çınar 2001, 369–70). The ideal path for modernization for
the new Turkish state was projected as distant from Islam and Ottomanism
but also as retaining a sense of uniqueness and authenticity measured by
distance from excessive Westernization (Yeğenoğlu 1998, 133–34). As
such, Turkish modernization has always been marked by a negotiation of
Islam on the one hand and Westernism on the other. This negotiation
not only yielded the emergence of a new nation-state, articulated in the
new legal frame and secular institutions, but also continued to generate
alternatives that repeatedly challenged the official project of modernity
throughout the twentieth century. For example, the Islamist movement
emerged around the Refah Party in the late 1980s and started to produce
a counterdiscourse to official modernity. Contesting official modernity
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that had defined itself as West oriented, the Islamist discourse identified
itself as an East-oriented project (Çınar 2005).
Unveiling the body and the making of the new nation-state
In the initial years of the secular Republic, its founders were preoccupied
with the forging of a new image for the new nation-state, which was
facilitated by the construction and display of new gender identities (see,
e.g., Göle 1996; Kandiyoti 1997; Yeğenoğlu 1998). Since the new state
was being built on the principles of modernization, Westernization, and
secularism, this new national identity had to bear the mark of modernity,
which meant not only the appearance of Westernism but also a break from
the Ottoman past, a revolutionary diversion from Ottoman ways, against
which the national subject could be constituted. The Hat Law of 1925
is only one of the instances through which the state undertook revolu-
tionary changes to institute marks of modernity, nationalism, and West-
ernism in the public sphere. In the justification for the Hat Law, it was
noted that “the issue of headgear, which is completely unimportant in
and of itself, is of special value for Turkey who wants to become a member
of the family of modern nations. We propose to abolish the hat worn
currently, which has become a mark of difference between Turkey and
other modern nations, and replace it with the hat that is the common
headgear of all modern, civilized nations” (quoted in Aktaş [1991, 143]).6
It is clear from this statement that the founding state was directly and
explicitly intervening on the bodies of its citizens by regulating and dic-
tating the norms of the public attire and dress to erase marks of difference
(i.e., Islam) and to institute marks of civilization in the quest toward the
constitution of a new state around a new, national, “modern, civilized”
identity. When Mustafa Kemal Atatürk introduced the Hat Law, himself
dressed in international clothes with a top hat, he said, “Gentlemen, the
Turkish people who founded the Turkish Republic are civilized; they are
civilized in history and in reality. But I tell you as your own brother, as
your friend, as your father, that the people of the Turkish Republic, who
claim to be civilized, must show and prove that they are civilized, by their
ideas and their mentality, by their family life and their way of living. . . .
My friends, international dress is worthy and appropriate for our nation,
and we will wear it” (quoted in Yeğenoğlu [1998, 133]; translation as it
appears there).
Even though the Hat Law did not formally target women’s attire, the
state was directly involved in promoting its new image through the vis-
6 All Turkish-to-English translations are the author’s unless otherwise noted.
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ibility of women in the public sphere. The Islamic attire of women that
included the traditional veil was not banned, but local governments were
asked to oversee the issue, and in some cities the veil was banned in public
spaces through local regulations (Aktaş 1991, 170–73).
Under the leadership of Kemal Atatürk, the state was actively engaged
in promoting the new modern, Westernized, secular image of the nation
through images of women in the public sphere. Kemal Atatürk pioneered
the promotion of this new image in his personal life, not only by changing
his own clothing to demonstrate the new norms of male public visibility
as laid down by the Hat Law but also by having banquets and dance
receptions organized and sponsored by the state, to which he would take
his wife and daughters dressed in elegant Western gowns. Because it had
been quite uncommon for a husband and wife to appear together in public
places only a decade before, let alone dance and dine together, Mustafa
Kemal’s bold efforts were seen as revolutionary attempts to create the
“new woman” as a “symbol of the break with the past” (Kandiyoti 1991,
41). Those in secularist elite circles around Mustafa Kemal saw themselves
as soldiers of a civilizing mission who were going to lead Turkish society
toward a new modern, Westernized, secular lifestyle. They did this by
appearing in public places as husband and wife, dressing in European-
style clothing, gathering in coffeehouses and restaurants that served Eu-
ropean dishes, and engaging in activities such as horseback riding or play-
ing golf in prestigious clubs (Göle 1996, 61). The state was promoting
the presence of women in public places and in occupations that were
readily associated with men, encouraging women to become lawyers, pi-
lots, parliamentarians, athletes, and scholars. Images of women engaged
in modern activities and occupations while dressed in modern clothes
proliferated in the public sphere. The state produced and distributed, not
only in Turkey but also in Europe, photographs of women in military
training, in athletic competitions, in courtrooms as lawyers, in the parlia-
ment as politicians, and as pilots, engineers, and teachers (Graham-Brown
1988, 218–21).
Marking bodies and political agency
These examples illustrate the ways in which the new state used women’s
public visibility as a strategic means through which Turkey’s new secular
identity could be displayed. This was done mainly because the state tar-
geted Europe as the ultimate referee that needed to be convinced of
Turkey’s new modern, Westernized identity. The founders were quite
aware that European perceptions of the Turks were sharply conditioned
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by an orientalist view that saw the Islamic lifestyle as one that confines
women behind harem walls and by images of veiled women as a symbol
of oppression and barbarism (Alloula 1986). According to Leila Ahmed,
the projection of Islam as barbaric, oppressive of women, and backward,
which was a product of nineteenth-century colonial enterprises, served to
justify colonizing interventions in the Middle East as acts of liberation of
women, producing a form of what Ahmed refers to as “colonial feminism”
(1992, 152). Ahmed also shows how this colonial narrative of Islam and
veiling came to be uncritically adopted by the local intelligentsia to such
an extent that it formed the basis of newly emerging nationalist identities
in the region. In Turkey, this view of Islam was not only internalized by
the intelligentsia but also became official state policy. As a result, images
of women “emancipated” from the confines of the veil and the harem,
with a solid presence in the public sphere, engaged in modern activity,
and wearing Western clothing, enabled the new Turkish state to distance
itself from the “barbaric” ways of the Ottomans and Islam and to align
itself with Europe.
During the early years of the Republic, the state not only promoted
images of modern, Westernized women in the public sphere but also
developed legislative measures involving women’s direct participation in
public and political life. A new civil code was adopted in 1926 that man-
dated equal rights in inheritance and marital affairs, and women were
granted full suffrage in 1934. Various autonomous women’s organizations
and groups were consolidated by the state in 1924 under the Turkish
Women’s Federation to encourage women to take active roles in the public
sphere and political life (Graham-Brown 1988, 220).7
The goal of the state in undertaking such measures was outlined by
Kemal Atatürk when he was commenting on the granting of full suffrage
to women: “This decision has earned Turkish women a higher status than
that of the women of other nations. In the future, it will be necessary to
search for covered, veiled and caged women [only] in history books. . . .
By participating in general elections, Turkish women are now using the
most important of all rights. This right, which is denied to women in
many civilized countries, is now fully available to Turkish women” (quoted
in Eldeniz [1956, 741]).
As suggested in this statement, the state was primarily concerned with
promoting a new image for Turkey by demonstrating how it was liberating
its women and ensuring a modern, civilized life for its citizens. These
7 For detailed information on this period see Kandiyoti (1991) and Arat (1997).
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ideas resonated strongly among the members of the Turkish Women’s
Federation, who had assumed the civilizing mission so much so that the
group’s leader, Latife Bekir, said, “in Turkey, women have been called by
Kemal Atatürk to rid themselves of the veil and take their places alongside
men” (quoted in Aktaş [1991, 172]).
This line of thinking, which reflected the core constitutional tenet of
the founding ideology of the new Turkish state, maintained that women’s
place and role in society are the most significant indicators that Turkey is
a modern and civilized country, a goal that can be achieved if and only
if Turkey distances itself from Islam. The image of the modern, Western-
ized, liberated woman in the public sphere, which was attained by the
erasure of the mark of Islam—the veil—from the body, was a matter of
the realization of the foundational cause of the new Turkish state toward
acquiring a modern and civilized identity. Indeed, Kemal Atatürk himself
saw the practice of veiling as a malady, a “barbarous posture” or an “object
of ridicule” that needed to be corrected (Atatürk 1984, 19).
This generous extension of women’s rights by the state, sometimes
referred to as “state feminism,” functioned similarly to what Ahmed refers
to as “colonial feminism” (1992, 152) in that, as feminist critics have
stressed, it was a rhetorical strategy mobilized to promote official ideology
and project a new image for Turkey as a West-oriented, modern, and
civilized country (Arat 1997). Such “state feminism” (White 2003), which
was celebrated by Kemalists for contributing to the well-being and eman-
cipation of women, was criticized by feminists who suggested that the
granting of women’s rights by the state was done only to promote official
ideology and that the state was not at all interested in the actual experiences
and well-being of women (Tekeli 1982; Arat 1997). Indeed, the Turkish
Women’s Federation that was formed in 1924 and had devoutly cam-
paigned in support of the state’s secularist reforms was disbanded in
1935—only a year after full suffrage was granted to women—because the
federation went against state policy when it signed an international pe-
tition for peace and disarmament (Kandiyoti 1991, 41–42). Feminists
argue that while the state was seemingly granting women’s rights it se-
riously undermined the development of an autonomous women’s move-
ment by bringing all women’s organizations under state control through
the Women’s Federation. When the federation dissolved, Turkey was left
without any association for women. Indeed, autonomous women’s move-
ments did not reemerge until the 1990s, and the percentage of women
serving in elective office did not reach the level achieved in 1937 (i.e.,
eighteen women parliamentarians, constituting 4.6 percent of the Great
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National Assembly) for the next seventy years. In fact, it predominantly
remained below 2 percent, and only in the 2007 general elections did it
finally reach 9 percent.
The state’s promotion of women in the public sphere has been inter-
preted as a call for women “to be active agents in the building of a modern
nation” (Göle 1997, 67). This view is in accordance with a Habermasian
notion that sees participation in the public sphere as a means of acquiring
political agency. However, as feminist criticism suggests, the public visi-
bility granted to women by the Turkish state has actually served to deny
agency to women and to deny their organizations an autonomous pres-
ence in the public sphere. In fact, women’s enhanced presence in the
public sphere has allowed the state to constitute itself as the secular po-
litical agent capable of producing a public sphere in accordance with its
own foundational norms and principles. Through a series of regulated
interventions that orchestrated women’s visibility in the public sphere,
the secular state constructed itself as the political agent that unveiled the
female body, dressing it in accordance with secular ideals and principles
so as to display Turkey’s new national identity for a Western global gaze.
Headscarf: Marking the boundaries of the public and the private
It is in such a discursive context that university students wearing Islamic
headscarves appeared in the Turkish public sphere in the 1980s, a sphere
that had been kept closely under the surveillance of secularism. By ac-
quiring an undeniable visibility on the university campus—the epitome of
the modern, the urban, the rational, and the progressive—this potent
symbol of Islam disrupted the binaries that maintained secularism as the
unmarked, privileged center. In the public world created by secularism,
Islam could not possibly have an existence in a university setting. This is
why secularist circles reacted to the headscarf with outrage, calling for
stricter measures for its suppression, which eventually culminated in a ban
against the headscarf in all schools and public offices that remains in effect
to this day.
The secularist antagonism eventually culminated in the National Se-
curity Council decree in February 1997 that called for tighter measures
against “the rising threat of reactionism (irtica)” (Eraydın 2006), in-
cluding the ban on the headscarf. Reflecting the views of the military,
which was the key force behind this decree, a high-ranking military officer
who was asked, “Is it really the end of the world if civil servants begin
wearing headscarves?” answered, “Yes. It is the end of the world” (Kinzer
1997). Ten years later—even after the successor of the Islamist Refah
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Party, the Adalet ve Kalkınma (AK, or Justice and Development) Party
of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, came to power and, for the first time in the
nation’s history, Turkey’s first lady is wearing the Islamic headscarf—this
perception of the headscarf as a threat continues, and it is still not allowed
in schools, university campuses, or public offices. Many religiously ori-
ented university students across campuses in Turkey compromise by com-
ing to school with either wigs or hats to cover their heads.
The disruptive power of the headscarf lies in its ability to redraw the
boundaries of the private on the body, thereby redefining the constitutive
limits of the public. If the public sphere is understood as those spaces and
places that are open to the public gaze, then closing off certain spaces
and places—and body parts—as private redraws the boundaries of the
public. By delineating that which is private, the headscarf delimits the
public gaze, the very mechanism through which the public is constituted.
Because the norms and boundaries that constitute the public are not only
formed but also challenged and subverted by shifting, manipulating, or
displacing the boundaries of the private, the headscarf becomes a potent
threat. It is exactly through the manipulation of the boundaries of the
private as they are marked upon the body—particularly the female body—
that the headscarf becomes a subversive force when it emerges in the
secular public sphere, asserting its own unconventional and nonsecular
(Islamic) norms of privacy. Secularist norms that draw the public-private
boundaries upon the female body maintain that the hair and the neck are
open to the public gaze, whereas Islamic norms (as they are interpreted
by Islamists in Turkey) consider these aspects of female embodiment
strictly private. When women wearing the Islamic headscarf appear in
public spaces, especially in places like university campuses or public offices,
which are the strongholds of secularism, this seemingly trivial piece of
clothing imposes an Islamic frame on the public-private distinction and
unsettles the established secular norms that constitute publicness. Thus
the subversive effect of the Islamic headscarf lies in its power to redraw
the boundaries of public and private spheres, thereby unsettling the au-
thority of secularism over the body and the public sphere.
Drawing or shifting the public-private boundaries on the body through
clothing not only functions to set the norms around which the public
sphere is organized but also vests those who draw such boundaries on
the body with political agency. It is for this reason that the Turkish state
and other political actors have been interested in what people wear, where
they wear it, and how they wear it. Through regulating and monitoring
how people appear in the public realm, the state acquires political agency
and dictates its own norms and standards of nationhood. The Turkish
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nation was defined in terms of secularism, modernism, and Westernism
by unveiling the female body. Hence images of women in bathing suits
became one of the key symbols of the authority of secularism over the
body, circulating abundantly in photographs, cartoons, and illustrations
during the Republic’s formative years, which were vigorously promoted
by the state as proof of Turkey’s devotion to modernity (Çınar 2005,
63–64). But, just as secularism was institutionalized by the new Turkish
state through the unveiling of the female body, Islamism was instituted
by the Islamist elite of the Refah Party by reveiling the female body,
similarly using the clothing of the body as a site from which to project
their version of nationalism.
Islamist challenges and the headscarf: From public visibility to
national security
The unveiling of the female body by the secular state was an intervention
not only on bodies but also on Islam, which brought about a rupture in
Islam’s authority over the female body, which was maintained as a sacred
site protected by the veil. The institutionalization of secularism resulted
in a further rupture in Islam. On the one hand, orthodox Islam was
brought under the direct control of the secular state through the Direc-
torate of Religious Affairs, which supervised theology schools, advised
the public on Islamic knowledge and practice, and appointed the imams
of all mosques in Turkey. On the other hand, heterodox Islam, which is
basically the Islam of mystical Sufi orders and similar informal Islamic
groupings, lost its social standing after all such religious Sufi lodges and
orders (tekke and zaviye, respectively) were closed down in 1925.8 Nev-
ertheless, autonomous Islamic practices survived as informal mystical or-
ders often mobilized through personal networks around musical societies
or poetry and literature groups. Such heterodox Islamic practices had long
existed because their traditions of secrecy and discreetness allowed them
to maintain a low profile and to avoid the public gaze and the interventions
of the secularist state.
Between the founding of the Turkish Republic in 1923 and the mid-
1980s, secularist authority gained hegemonic status in the public sphere,
coming to be perceived as the natural commonsense standard around
which politics and public life were organized. This status allowed secularism
to enjoy the privilege of being an invisible (unmarked), nonnegotiable, and
8 Şerif Mardin differentiates between orthodox and heterodox Islam going back to the
Ottoman Empire and constituting the fabric of social and political life (1971).
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uncontestable norm. The Islamic headscarf, worn by university students in
public places, was one of the important elements that gave a new sort of
visibility to Islam in the public sphere, unsettling that norm.
The Refah Party, the main Islamic political party in Turkey, started to
grow in the late 1980s from a small, insignificant, right-wing party (with
less than 10 percent of the national vote) into a mass party that assumed
a more explicit Islamist identity. The Refah Party’s first electoral success
came with the local elections in 1994, when it won the mayoralties in
several cities, including Istanbul and the capital, Ankara. This success was
followed by a victory in the general elections in December 1995. With
Refah receiving the highest percentage of votes, party leader Necmettin
Erbakan became the prime minister of a coalition government in 1996.
Given the strong hold of secularism over the public sphere, secularist
circles were extremely troubled by these developments. Not only the mil-
itary, which saw itself as the chief guardian of secularist ideals, but, more
significantly, various civil society organizations and grassroots movements
perceived the rise of political Islam in Turkey as the single most important
threat to the well-being and security of the country.9 Growing pressure
from the military and these secularist associations and groups culminated
in the National Security Council’s decree in February 1997. As a con-
sequence, the coalition government fell, and Erbakan’s short but signif-
icant incumbency ended.
Throughout the 1990s, political and public life in Turkey revolved
around the Islam-secularism divide, and the Islamic headscarf remained
a top issue of antagonism between secularist and Islamist circles. Within
a decade, the headscarf went from being a controversial item of religious
attire to a matter of national security when it was identified as one of the
main indicators of the Islamic threat in the February 1997 admonition,
which called for the enforcement of the ban on the headscarf in all public
places including classrooms, universities, and public offices. The increasing
use of the Islamic headscarf was also one of the main reasons the Refah
Party was closed down by the Constitutional Court in January 1998
(Sabah 1998).
The ban on the headscarf had first been introduced when the Higher
Education Council passed a decree in December 1986, stating that it was
mandatory for students to wear “modern clothing” at all times on school
premises but leaving it up to university administrations to decide what
would constitute modern clothing. This decree paved the way for the ban
9 The popularization of secularism, which is referred to as the “privatization of state
ideology” is discussed in detail by Esra Özyürek (2006).
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on the headscarf, and in most universities across the country students were
denied entry to university premises unless they took off their headscarves.
This ban resulted in massive demonstrations, protests, and petition cam-
paigns not only by the students but by the supporters of the Refah Party
and by people in other Islamic circles as well. These protests were perceived
by secularist circles as a “rebellion against Atatürk’s reforms and the prin-
ciples of the republican state Kemal Atatürk established” (Cumhuriyet
1987). The resolute protests of the students with headscarves and the
adamant secularist backlash culminated in the Constitutional Court de-
cision in 1991 that introduced an unwavering ban on the headscarf. But
the antagonism continued until the National Security Council decree in
February 1997 mandated full enforcement of the headscarf ban, a man-
date endorsed by secularist civil society associations, all public offices, and
the government.
The February 1997 resolution was a crucial turning point in the politics
of Islam in Turkey, resulting in the dissolution of the Refah Party by the
Constitutional Court in 1998 and the barring of both Erbakan and Is-
tanbul’s mayor, Erdoğan, from active politics until 2003. While the party
was immediately reorganized under the Fazilet (Virtue) Party, this inter-
vention resulted in a split within the party ranks between the older-gen-
eration conservatives who chose to continue an antagonistic stance against
secularism and the younger-generation liberals who were in favor of com-
promise with secularists and organized around Erdoğan. The latter group
later formed the AK Party, which won the general parliamentary elections
in 2002. The overwhelming electoral victory of the AK Party brought
Erdoğan to power as Turkey’s first prime minister to lead an Islam-based
political party that controlled a majority of parliamentary seats. Moreover,
Erdoğan’s wife became Turkey’s first first lady to wear an Islamic headscarf.
Interestingly, the ban on the Islamic headscarf continues even under
AK Party rule. The fact that the first lady herself wears a headscarf only
carried the controversy to the level of formal state receptions and gath-
erings, which the prime minister and several other AK Party officials whose
wives wear headscarves attend without their wives so as not to violate
regulations that ban the headscarf in public offices.
The emergence of the Islamic headscarf in public spaces and the re-
sulting battle over the secularist norms of public life did not put an end
to the reign of secularist ideology or even weaken it. If anything, this
process has strengthened secularism, transforming it from an ideological
principle enforced by the state to a widely endorsed norm of public and
private life celebrated by civil society associations and grassroots move-
ments. Autonomous Islamist identities that have become visible in the
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public sphere through the headscarf, however, certainly have had a pow-
erful impact—revealing the authoritative and privileged status of secular-
ism and rendering it visible and contestable, thereby making it subject to
negotiation. Indeed, the headscarf dispute was the ultimate spark that
triggered ongoing negotiations over the principle of secularism, which
persist twenty years after the first ban on the headscarf was introduced in
1987.
Women and the public sphere
While the headscarf has a subversive effect on the power and authority of
secularism, it has a rather unexpected subjugating effect on its wearers.
Just as the public visibility of modern women in the early years of the
Republic served to constitute the state as a political agent and to deny
agency to the women themselves, the headscarf has had the same effect,
constituting the political agency of certain Islamic male elites at the cost
of the agency of those women who are the most visible bearers of Islamic
identity. The headscarf has served to give Islam a presence in the public
sphere, but at the same time it confines headscarf-wearing women to that
specific symbolic presence. While the bearers of the mark of Islamic iden-
tities—veiled women—opened up public spaces to Islam, it was predom-
inantly men who gained political agency through this new publicity. In
this respect, the Islamist male elite hijacked the power of the headscarf
from the women who wore it by declaring it the symbol of the struggle
of Islam against secularism. Consider, for example, the experiences of a
veiled lawyer, Gönül Arslan, who notes that she has encountered discrim-
inatory behavior not only from secularists who express disdain because of
her clothing but also from Islamists who unfairly privilege her only because
of her headscarf. Arslan notes that “Islamic identity should not be iden-
tified with a person’s place and status in society. . . . Islamic identity
becomes a social identity, which should not happen.” As she points out,
“Muslim men do not have to face this kind of discrimination because they
don’t bear any marks of difference,” nor are their political options con-
strained by the privilege of relegation to Islamic symbol (quoted in Tezcan
[1996, 6]). The headscarf gives a certain degree of freedom to Islamist
men, since they are able to enjoy the privileges of the public visibility of
Islam without having to suffer the consequences of bearing its mark.
The headscarf—or the image of the veiled woman as a representation
of Islam—proliferated in Islamist discourses during the 1990s. The leaders
of the Refah Party actively promoted images of veiled women in their
election campaigns. During public meetings and rallies, veiled women
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were gathered in the front and were made the focus of media attention.
Islamist writers rallied behind the headscarf, which, according to one
columnist, is “akin to the national flag” (Kaplan 1996, 2), and the Islamists
who launched the Fazilet Party after the Refah Party disbanded in 1998
considered making the headscarf the official party symbol (Milliyet 1998).
But the bearers of the mark of Islam find that the public visibility that
the headscarf has earned them is also serving to deny them public agency.
This is most explicitly illustrated in the way that the same party, Refah,
that encouraged the proliferation of the image of the veiled woman in
the public sphere actively discouraged the presence of women in its ranks.
The Refah Party did not have a single woman in any of its administrative
ranks as it rose to prominence or when it was banned in 1998.10 Sibel
Eraslan, the former leader of the Women’s Commission of the Refah Party,
who had organized an immensely successful election campaign in Istanbul
before the local elections in 1994, was denied an administrative post in
the city administration after the party’s electoral victory. When she de-
manded an active position in the administration, she and her associates
were removed from their positions at the Women’s Commission, to be
replaced by the wives and daughters of top-level party officials.11
The city administration of Istanbul under Erdoğan’s mayoralty
(1994–98) diverted a great deal of its resources to the creation of an
intellectually sophisticated and rich field of activities around conferences,
seminars, and panels, to which a wide variety of speakers were invited
from both within Turkey and abroad, including secularists, Islamists,
liberals, and Marxists. The only group of people systematically excluded
from these events were Islamic women intellectuals. Those few who were
invited to participate were allowed to address topics only concerning
women and the family, whereas non-Islamist women academics were in-
vited as speakers on themes that were relevant to their specific fields,
ranging from politics to law and the arts. When Eraslan, a political activist
and lawyer, was invited to panels and seminars, regardless of whether they
were organized by Islamists or secularists, she was invariably expected to
talk only about issues related to the headscarf or new veiling and the status
of women in Islam, not about her political views or about her research
in law.12 As noted by Ayşe Saktanber, “covered women cannot raise their
voices and speak through the tenets of women’s opposition, no matter
10 Refah’s successor, the Fazilet Party, recruited some women to its ranks to save face,
yet none of these women wore headscarves.
11 Sibel Eraslan, interviewed by the author, July 15, 1997, Istanbul.
12 Sibel Eraslan, interviewed by the author, September 13, 1996, Istanbul.
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how successful they are as political activists or how well educated they are
as intellectuals” (2006, 28).
As a result of increasing demands by Islamic women intellectuals to be
represented in the conferences and panels organized by the city admin-
istration, a new series of monthly panels for women was launched, titled
“Meetings about Us” (Bize Dair Toplantılar). This series was organized
in cooperation with PÜMER (Proje Üretim Merkezi; Center for the Pro-
duction of Projects), a research center established by a group of Islamic
women intellectuals, journalists, writers, artists, and lawyers. Just as the
title “Meetings about Us” designates women as a specific group set apart
from the public requiring a panel series of their own, the panel themes
have also confined the issues to those specific to women, as indicated in
their titles: “Women in Politics,” “Popular Culture and Women,” “Women
and the Public Sphere,” “Women and Family,” “Women in the Media,”
and so on. While this panel series opened up an important opportunity
for Islamic women intellectuals to participate in debates, it also served to
confine them to women’s issues and exclude them from all the other panels
and conferences that were crucial sites of public debate and discussion.
Tying public visibility of Islam to the headscarf has enhanced the po-
litical agency of male Islamist elites in another way, as illustrated by men’s
reluctance to bear the mark of Islamic identity themselves. Islamist men
have strongly resisted the visibility of male Islamic identities in the public
sphere. Calling for the negotiation of gender hierarchies operating within
Islamist discourse, a group of Islamic women intellectuals attempted to
open up a discussion on Islamic male identities: “When we look around
us, we see a lot of books, panels and seminars on how women should be
in Islam. [During sermons] the imams in mosques tell their male audiences
how women should be in Islam. . . . While Muslim female identity is
discussed in detail and is always on the agenda, ‘Muslim male identity’
never really becomes an issue. [We] wonder why. . . . Is it because the
term ‘Muslim’ already means ‘Muslim man’? And thus a ‘Muslim female
identity’ has to be specified as a separate category?” (Şişman and Böhürler
1993, 16). Male Islamists dismissed this call for negotiation, repudiating
the allusion to male power as a “fake” problem that was not an “internal
matter or a vital issue, but an imposition upon us [Islamic circles] from
the outside” (Şişman and Böhürler 1993, 27).13 Thus, while their images
13 These are the words of İsmail Kara, a prominent Islamic intellectual who is the author
of Türkiye’de İslamcılık Düsüncesi [Islamic thought in Turkey] (1986), the first and most
comprehensive work on this topic. His dismissal of the debate on Islamic male identity was
in response to questions posed by Şişman and Böhürler, who initiated this debate in a monthly
Islamic publication (1993, 27).
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are constantly being promoted in public displays toward the construction
of new Islamic identities, veiled women cannot find any agency or even
recognition as subjects other than as veiled women. For this reason, Er-
aslan has argued that “women are not present in the public sphere, only
their images are.”14
Just as the secularist state of the founding years constructed itself as a
political agent by inscribing a new national consciousness through the
bodies of unveiled women in the public sphere, the Islamists of the 1990s
(particularly the Refah Party) constructed themselves as the political agents
who would introduce a new national identity by forging and manipulating
images of Muslim women. And just as the increased public visibility of
women in the 1920s and 1930s operated not to grant but in fact to deny
political agency to women, so did the proliferation of the images of veiled
women in the public sphere operate to deny agency to Islamic women in
the 1990s and onward.
The subjugating effect of the public sphere is evident, then, not only
in the ways that women are silenced and excluded from public life but
also in the particular forms their presence takes and the conditions struc-
turing their inclusion. The public sphere is a field of power relations that
subjugates by instituting a regime of visibility that exerts tight control
over modes of symbolic representation as well as the terms and conditions
of political participation. Both these techniques of control effectively deny
agency to particular gendered citizens. Although outright exclusion has
come to be recognized as a mode of oppression, controlled inclusion struc-
tured by particular regimes of visibility has not yet secured that recognition.
Contrary to the emancipatory ideals attributed to the Habermasian
public sphere, public visibility and voice do not necessarily promote po-
litical liberties. As a regime of visuality, the public sphere also operates to
deny agency by constructing a public gaze that continuously marks and
categorizes subjectivities. As the Turkish case makes clear, both the evo-
lution of a secular public sphere under the surveillance of the state and
recent Islamist appropriations of the public sphere have depended upon
the production and manipulation of proliferating images of women, un-
veiled and reveiled, as a technology of controlled inclusion that enhances
the political agency of men while seriously constraining women.
Department of Political Science
Bilkent University
14 Sibel Eraslan, interviewed by the author, September 13, 1996, Istanbul.
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